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Abstract 
Three quarters of UK Local Authorities (LAs) have declared Climate Emergencies. Most include an ambition for 
carbon neutrality by 2030. Yet a lack of clarity on a national policy framework through to 2030 means that LAs 
now face the challenge of creating an enabling environment to respond to urgent Climate Emergency targets.  
This paper reviews the implications of the LA Climate Emergency Declarations for local policy making in 
respect of low carbon retrofit. It will focus on evidence from a council whose dedicated project team is creating 
and implementing 2030 Climate response strategies, as well as built environment practitioners who have 
expertise to deliver retrofit services. Using documentary evidence and expert testimony, this paper will explore 
the gaps in creating an enabling environment/policy roadmap to 2030, the role might local government play in 
delivering large scale domestic retrofit, and how to align the various stakeholder groups.  
The paper finds that despite the simplistic term ‘retrofit’, the domestic retrofit landscape is far from simple. It is 
not a homogenous entity, rather a complex, multi-layered and segmented eco-system. We propose reviewing this 
segmentation through the lens of ‘first-mover’ which would help clarify where efforts should be focused, and 
which measures could be taken to accelerate consumer engagement. The authors discover there is potential for 
Local Authorities to develop novel approaches to retrofit processes, by taking the role of ‘middle actor’, 
reshaping the customer journey and engaging a range of stakeholders to stimulate local economies and deliver on 
social and environmental goals. Open collaboration with third sector organisations can provide access to 
research, resources, and networks to help deploy rapid change solutions.  
Introduction 
In 2019 the UK Parliament declared a binding policy target of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Also 
in 2019, UK Local Governments began declaring climate emergencies, many of which included targets to be 
carbon neutral by 2030. At the time of writing, three quarters of UK District, County, Unitary, and Metropolitan 
Councils have declared a climate emergency, as well as 8 Combined Authorities (City Regions)  
(climateemergency.uk, 2021). For the sake of narrative clarity, these different formats of UK local government 
will be simplified as Local Authorities (LAs) for the purposes of this paper. 
Within the wider capacity building challenges presented by the climate emergency declarations at both national 
and local level, this paper focuses on rapid change solutions within the built environment, and specifically 
creating an enabling environment for retrofitting existing buildings at scale.  
There is now an asymmetry in UK climate policy, with national government pursuing a net zero 2050 target and 
the majority of its local governments seeking more aggressive 2030 targets for much of their stock. Many 
national government decisions (such as the future of the gas grid) will have significant impacts on any local 
strategy, but these decisions will not be made quickly enough for the 2030 timeline. This creates a great 
challenge for LAs in creating rapid change solutions within an environment of political uncertainty. Local 
Governments must create strategies that are cross-sectoral and flexible so as not to preclude future policy 
pathways. They must also focus on creating an enabling environment so that future policies at both the national 
and local levels can be more effectively implemented.  
Driving retrofit at scale has long been a challenge for the UK, and declarations of climate emergencies now give 
new urgency to the issue, as well as create new constraints given the policy uncertainty through to 2030. This 
paper will consider the barriers that will impact local policy responses to climate emergency declarations. In 
particular, it will focus on hidden barriers that are under-acknowledged and describe the missing or misaligned 
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policies and processes that result. It will use documentary evidence and expert testimony, including 10 semi-
structured interviews with key local stakeholders to explore the following research questions:  
1. What barriers exist in creating an enabling environment/policy roadmap to 2030?  
2. What are the respective roles of local and central government?  
3. What is needed to align other stakeholders?  
It will begin with a review of the existing literature, briefly summarising the well acknowledged barriers in the 
retrofit space. It then describes the methods and new data underpinning this work to analyse the research 
questions above and new findings to help stakeholders further understand the retrofit ecosystem, and overcome 
misperceptions and barriers. It will close with a discussion of retrofit capacity-building in the broader context of 
UK climate policy, as well as recommendations for local governments in creating their climate emergency 
strategies through to 2030. 
Literature 
Retrofitting homes and buildings is widely acknowledged as among the most challenging policy and technical 
issues in meeting our net zero ambitions. Not least, the current rate of renovation in the UK needs to increase by 
around 7 times, rising to 9 times in England which is significantly behind the devolved nations in rate and scale 
of energy efficiency renovations (BEIS, 2019). This means that over the next 29 years, every building in the 
country needs to undergo a major retrofit making retrofit the most important and the most challenging part of the 
UK’s net-zero programme for the built environment with the amount of effort, and the degree of active planning 
and direction required ‘unprecedented in peacetime’ (CITB, 2021). 
The issue of retrofit is long studied in the UK, and many existing policy barriers have been very well 
documented. Past research has very thoroughly explored the barriers at play in driving retrofit at scale, such as 
technology choices, upfront cost, unclear supply chains, and skills gaps, leaving industry experts to conclude that 
achieving net zero requires major changes in buildings and construction practices, ‘but both remain very hard to 
achieve’ (Killip, 2020). Furthermore, ‘the problem of decarbonising heating in buildings has been studied for 
more than 20 years, but there is still no settled consensus on strategy or choice of technology (Oreszczyn et al, 
2020). There is a wide body of research with actionable policy recommendations to address many of these 
barriers (see e.g.  Bonfield, 2016) and yet the core problems persist. 
Policies thus far have largely focused on single-measure installations, and much of this low-hanging fruit has 
already been reached. Despite this, UK buildings still account for 17% of total UK GHG emissions, mainly the 
result of burning fossil fuels for heating (CCC, 2020) and these emissions are largely considered hard to treat. At 
the heart of this issue is the fact that the UK has spent decades of infrastructure investment to deliver low-cost 
natural gas, and the UK heating system (more than any EU contemporary) is almost wholly reliant on this single, 
high carbon, energy vector. The future of the UK gas grid is the subject of intense study and wide debate, the 
scope of which is outside this paper. There is currently no clear consensus, although the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC) suggests that ‘19 million heat pumps need to be installed by 2050’ (HPA, 2019)  and ‘the role of 
hydrogen as a vector for supplying heat to individual homes is … only likely to play a strategic role in providing 
backup for the electricity grid at multiple levels, including the very long-term energy storage that will be needed 
from about 2040 onwards’ (Oreszczyn et al, 2020).  
This lack of a clear, cohesive government policy on energy efficiency is causing retrofit to fall behind other 
sectors, such as transport and energy generation in terms of decarbonisation. There is a need for more detailed 
plans and a coherent policy framework. Further support is needed to reach net zero ahead of 2050, as many 
councils have committed to do. Local authorities need multi-year supportive policy and resourcing frameworks 
(ADEPT, 2020). No surprise, then that the debate continues to create uncertainty not just for resource allocation 
at the local level, but also in respect of the actions that councils should be undertaking to support skills 
development and wider market capacity building activities.  
There is also the issue of fixing a broken retrofit eco-system. For example, the UKGBC retrofit playbook cites 
the systemic failure in tackling the retrofit challenge is compounded by piecemeal national policy, and cites 
national level issues such as an over-emphasis on ‘top-down’ policy, a planning system that does not adequately 
address retrofit, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) not being fit for purpose, and at local level, a lack of 
long-term strategy, short-term funding and annual budgets, and lack of resource (UKGBC, 2020).  
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Method 
This paper aims to evaluate attitudinal barriers alongside systemic process issues. Attitudinal unknowns can 
involve factors such as long-held unconscious biases, for example stakeholder attitudes towards traditional 
structures and hierarchies, cultural norms or familiarity. Because these barriers are unseen, they act to override 
choices within a rational choice framework, making it harder for organisations to affect a move away from 
incumbency, even when that move is logical and fits within stated aims.  
One example of this type of attitudinal bias was an energy efficiency study researching consumer barriers to 
early market utility switching. The researchers discovered that consumers held unspoken concerns around gas 
safety and worried that switching from the incumbent might incur the displeasure of the ‘Gas Board’ who would 
then refuse to help if they got called out to a gas leak. The industry had created a switch process, wholly unaware 
that consumers had little knowledge of the physical and organisation structures of utilities beyond their fuse own 
box. This barrier was addressed by explaining to consumers that switching was simply a billing mechanism, they 
would be using ‘the same pipes and wires’ and getting ‘the same good service around gas safety’.  
This paper also looks at practical gaps caused by poorly aligned policies, poorly designed processes and legacy 
issues, which might be informational, functional, or fiscal. These particular obstacles tend to be poorly 
acknowledged or hidden among other factors Even once attitudinal barriers have been identified, these hidden 
process gaps severely limit action in response, and vice versa. Understanding hidden attitudinal and process 
barrier is key to understanding stakeholder engagement, mapping customer journeys and designing programmes 
and interventions that effect systemic change (Gillich, 2018). By exploring the issue of attitudinal and process 
barriers in concert, we aim to seek new insights into the longstanding issue of retrofit that can support Local 
Government decision making in creating rapid chance solutions to the climate emergency. 
This work began with a study of how to apply the CEREB Framework, a methodology for programme design to 
enable retrofit market transformation, to a local authority in the UK (UKGBC, 2020). The CEREB Framework is 
based on the study of over 50 market transformation programmes. In evaluating methodology for the design of 
‘optimal’ domestic retrofit programmes, the frameworks identifies a set of five common pillars needed to build 
successful retrofit markets over time (Gillich, 2018): 1) local market understanding; 2) engaging homeowners; 
3) workforce engagement; 4) financial incentives and 5) data and evaluation. This study sought to describe the 
first pillar of the CEREB Framework - local market understanding - for one LA by using a qualitative research 
approach which included a literature review and documentary analysis of the local policies surrounding the 
delivery of retrofit over decade leading to 2030, as well as semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders.  
Market data was initially drawn from international sources comprising published peer-reviewed academic 
literature plus some non-peer-reviewed, so-called ‘grey’ reports from consultancy groups, independent think 
tanks, government agencies and others. The review spans evidence from almost 60 documents, primarily from 
the UK, with some spanning Europe, Asia and North America.  
Our researchers also sought input from a breadth of retrofit and built environment commentators such as 
academics and market analysts, retrofit focused workshops and conferences, and education, skills and 
apprenticeship bodies.Preliminary data was gathered via shared learning at workshops and conferences and 
informal one-to-one interviews. As the research project progressed, sector specialists were approached for 
recommendations and directions towards broader research and relevant policy information. A selection of 10 
local stakeholders was identified for semi-structured qualitative interviews. Expert testimony was sought from a 
‘local government staff member’ in the form of a written questionnaire and their responses are used to 
triangulate the paper’s findings (see Discussion section). 
The stakeholder interview candidates were identified from the pool of employers sending students to London 
South Bank University under a built environment degree apprenticeship program. They represented a range of 
organisations, ranging from SME’s with 50 employees on a single site, to 7,000 UK employees and a global 
presence within the built environment sector, with a building services offer. Of the 10 who agreed to take part in 
semi-structured interviews, seven at director level with engineering qualifications, and three were HR managers 
with oversight of training.  
Semi-structured interviews are a suitable tool in seeking to understand unconscious and conscious attitudinal 
barriers as well as systemic, operational and legacy issues within a complex system such as retrofit. Interviewees 
were posed a short list of open framed questions to gain an understanding about the impact of the Climate 
Emergency on their organisation, process and service offering changes, and an understanding how their 
organisation approached ‘up-skilling and/or up-sizing their workforce to meet the growing demands of the green 
economy.’ A specific question was posed around attitudes to retrofit, (avoiding a prescriptive definition), with 
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further probing as to the meaning for that particular stakeholder and / or their business. Each interview was 
conducted over MS Teams and lasted for one hour. Prior to the interview starting, permission was gained from 
interviewees for the researcher make voice recordings and store /interrogate transcripts for the purposes of this 
research project.  
After all interviews were complete, transcripts were loaded into NVIVO software, a qualitative analysis system, 
and analysed across 8 primary nodes. Nodes are themes for which the analyst records trends. The primary nodes 
reflected the soft interview structure. Following analysis under these primary nodes, the data was then divided 
into further nodes as other themes emerged (See figure 1.) A mind map of themes was created, and comments 
categorised to create meaning and segment differing attitudes across the cohort. This then highlighted further 
areas that required verification, questioning (of respondents, industry experts) or further in-depth research.  
 
Figure 1: Shows the intitial Phase 1 (internal and external market drivers) and Phase 2 (emergent themes) 
which were selected as nodes in NVIVO software to conduct qualitative evaluation of stakeholder semi-
structured interview transcript, with core findings that further informed the research direction.  
The 4 specific core findings that informed the research direction were identified as:  
1. Closing knowledge gaps: Whilst a shift of focus as a response to the Climate Emergency is evident 
across the sector, a training lag / knowledge gap is widely reported  
2. Market stimulation: A step change in scale of retrofit is widely accepted as being imminent and 
inevitable, but the market is not forming of its own volition 
3. Terminology: Retrofit is a generic term and means different things across different segments; retrofit 
as a catch-all is an inadequate term for the complexities of the process and of the market.  
4. Segmentation: The different meanings and modes of operation needs clearer segmentation and a 
more nuanced understanding of drivers and inhibitors. 
Qualitative research included literature review and documentary analysis of the local policies and forecasts 
surrounding the delivery of retrofit over a decade leading to 2030. This involved a library (internet-based) search 
for papers, policy documents and resources specifically mentioning the terms: retrofit; local authority retrofit; 
net zero; net zero building; decarbonisation; fabric first; energy efficiency; retrofit skills; Trustmark; PAS2035.  
As with the qualitative interviews, findings were was evaluated using NVIVO. A selection of the most relevant 
articles, papers and reports were loaded onto the NVIVO system and analysed using a series of nodes and sub-
nodes relating to the selected data points (See figure 2). This process involved highlighting relevant extracts and 
assigning them to the appropriate node or sub-node. New nodes and sub-nodes were added as new themes 
emerged and unused nodes discarded on an iterative basis. The outputs of each node were then further analysed 
to extract themes emerging from across the literature, particularly where these gave new insights, for example, 
nuances around the skills and knowledge gap, terminology, segmentation, generic and specific definitions of 
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Figure 2: Shows the 8 primary nodes and 27 subnodes selected as data points in NVIVO software, in order to 
conduct a qualitative evaluation of selected articles, papers and reports pertinent to the research topics.  
Analysis 
The role of Local Authorities 
The role of Local Authorities as drivers of change in respect of Climate Emergency Action is wholly 
complementary to their role in creating of a positive socioeconomic environment for citizens. Councils possess 
‘unique insight into local communities and circumstances’ and ‘their service delivery and regulatory functions, 
and their convening power enables them to drive carbon emissions reductions … in ways that can also deliver 
better public health, reduced inequalities, a healthier environment and thriving local economies.’ (ADEPT, 2020) 
The significance of Local Authorities deploying their vertical and horizontal influence to effect rapid change has 
been demonstrated in their response to the Covid-19 crisis, ‘supporting and identifying and supporting 
vulnerable residents, joining up service delivery across agencies, and keeping central government on top of 
intelligence in every local authority area, often on a daily basis’. (ADEPT, 2020)  
Given the broad responsibilities and influence of local government, climate emergency responses are not limited 
to reducing their own carbon emissions, but involve complex, cross-sector planning and action. ADEPT’s 
‘Blueprint for accelerating climate action and a green recovery at the local level’ identified and grouped these 
activities across seven themes: 1) growing the zero and low carbon economy; 2) retrofitting homes and 
buildings; 3) decarbonising transport; 4) delivering zero carbon planning and development that protects and 
enhances nature; 5) reducing waste and encouraging sustainable consumption; 6) restoring nature for all and 6) 
developing local authority funding, governance and accounting systems that are fit for purpose. (ADEPT, 2020) 
However, despite this extraordinary reach and a willingness to act on Climate Change from the majority of 
councils and local authorities, they face many barriers and limitations - legacy issues, misaligned policies, and 
historical demarcation lines between Central and Local Government – which will inhibit the ability of Local 
Authorities to effect rapid, wholesale change at the rate and scale that is needed, and to which they have 
committed.  
Moving beyond finance deals  
Past large-scale policy efforts within the UK such as the Green Deal and the Green Homes Grant have largely 
focused on cost barriers.  Even when seeking ‘whole-house’ solutions incentives are often tied to specific 
measures. Outside isolated pilots, funding does not support the capacity-building activities needed to build a 
retrofit market in the longer term. Post-evaluation showed The Green Deal failed in part because it ‘did not 
sufficiently engage the workforce through an ongoing communication strategy’ and ‘should have better 
facilitated both technical and non-technical skills development’ (Gillich, 2017) and was also seen as a ‘dramatic 
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policy failure which has not driven any significant demand for energy efficiency measures in the ‘able-to-pay’ 
sector’ (CCC, 2016).  
Despite the many lessons to be learned from the Green Deal in 2013/15 another offering, the ‘Green Homes 
Grant’, was rushed in during 2020/21. In its haste to create a scheme to deliver economic stimulus, the 
Government failed to consult industry adequately on its delivery, set a timescale which was overly short term 
and has presided over scheme administration which was deemed ‘nothing short of disastrous’. (House of 
Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2021) 
Consumer perceptions 
These market-based schemes have typically failed to build capacity within the market in the longer term and also 
fail to engage inert consumers. The schemes operate on the assumption that consumers make rational cost-saving 
decisions, have energy savings on their radar, and have motivation to act – with or without all the obstacles in 
their way. Nor does it appear that increasing cultural concerns about climate change and the environment 
necessarily translate into heating system transitions, as people do not recognise the link between home heating 
and carbon emissions. (Anaam et al, 2020) Therefore we can conclude that expending effort to make energy 
savings remains a low priority for householders. This is shown not only in Green Deal take up, but also reflected 
in findings in energy utilities where policymakers have sometimes relied on a rather narrow view of the 
behaviour of consumers, by assuming they make wholly rational decisions. (Deller et al, 2021) 
These findings support another theme that emerged from the literature reviews and stakeholder research which 
relates to the need to increase engagement across all stakeholder groups. Citizen Advice’ ‘Lessons for net zero’, 
an evaluation of energy efficiency and low carbon home improvement schemes between 2012 and 2019, makes 
8 recommendations. The first two are ‘Design and implement a simple and easy to access consumer journey’ and 
‘Take all opportunities to influence behaviour’. Their report reflects other findings that engagement and 
conversion opportunities arise at the points in people’s lives when they tend to be more predisposed to making 
energy efficient home improvements. These are known as ‘trigger points’ and examples would be moving home, 
major building work or undertaking home improvements. They conclude that Government schemes could be 
more effective if they can engage consumers when making these changes, by providing accessible offers. 
(Citizens Advice, 2020)  Kerr et al advocate for a broader approach to stakeholder engagement, wanting to 
balance a ‘supply-push’ and ‘demand-pull’ approach. They identified the need to develop proactive, integrated 
retrofit supply chains as well as engage and service consumers. In this scenario supply-side firms and 
intermediary advisors would act as effective proponents of energy efficient retrofit, integrating the retrofit 
offering alongside much more prevalent general home renovations. (Kerr et al, 2018) 
Given the UK’s clear preference for market-based instruments over stronger regulatory frameworks, a far greater 
emphasis is also needed on understanding the mechanics - and failings - of the providers within that market and 
building trust within the market if it is to succeed. According to research conducted by Citizens Advice, quality 
problems are a particular risk for energy efficiency and low carbon technologies. Few consumers are familiar 
with these technologies and it’s hard to tell good work from bad. Many previous retrofit schemes have had well 
documented problems with substandard work, causing damage to building work and interiors, and leaving 
consumers with long-term problems in their homes that are costly to resolve, disruptive and distressing. (Citizens 
Advice, 2020) 
Therefore, a focus on upskilling and training for retrofit market creation is going to be a critical component. A 
major contributing factor to low quality outputs to date is that the market has given little or no incentive for the 
construction industry to align its skills, because ‘training does not confer any significant advantage in the labour 
market’ (Killip, 2020). Research into construction sector skills shows trained and untrained workers are 
competing for the same jobs, working in the same conditions of low pay, low job security and low prestige, and 
this leaves the sector very sensitive to wider economic cycles, with labour shortages in economic boom times 
followed by rapid drops in the numbers of jobs available during recessions. This has resulted in a significant 
skills shortage – both in terms of volumes of contractors and in relation to the mammoth task ahead – meaning 
‘profound labour market reform is required in the construction industry if the UK is to get anywhere close to net 
zero’. (Killip, 2020) 
Even in established professional segments, whilst the pathways to knowledge transfer may be better established 
within organisations than for individuals navigating the sector, there is low uptake on what it means to respond 
to the climate emergency. As one of Interview Case for this study put it: “In terms of upskilling, there’s not a 
sort of organised system in place... we kind of take it upon ourselves, it is a bit ad hoc. We’ve got a programme 
for general training, mandatory safety, making sure statutory liabilities are covered. All construction related. 
Beyond that, anything regarding green is less structured.” (Interview Case #5) 
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The research showed evidence that larger organisations with EU offices are getting information from their EU 
counterparts. The degree of preparedness and willingness to undertake training and adopt new technologies was 
made easier in these organisations that have access to horizontal knowledge share via EU colleagues. This is 
especially relevant where they operate in jurisdictions which are ahead on policy or tech adoption, for example 
the Netherlands where The Dutch government has mandated no gas-only boilers to be installed in homes from 
2021, leading to heat pump market growth of more than 50% per year and set to escalate as the policy embeds.  
 “We've had the benefit … we're a multinational company with offices in the EU, and they've got quite a good 
history. In fact, the way that you design heat pump systems is actually mandated.” (Interview Case #1) 
Terminology 
In carrying out and analysing the interview data for this study, it was clear that respondents carried different 
definitions for the term ‘retrofit’, and that in common parlance the word covers too many operational factors, 
funding options, and skills to be used as a catchall term. Our data uncovered a marked distinction between 
organisational and individual perceptions of the retrofit market and different drivers across these different 
stakeholder groups. This reflects Killip’s observation that construction itself is far from a homogeneous sector, 
covering as it does everything from handyman services to major infrastructure projects. There are different types 
of buildings, different types of firms, new-build and renovation projects. In terms of the workforce and 
workforce education, a key distinction is between professionals (designers, project managers, consultants) with 
university-level education as opposed to on-site construction workers, who may have vocational education and 
training (VET) at different levels, be apprentices or have no formal training at all. (Killip, 2020) 
This research found that those differences translated almost directly across to the retrofit sector, with massive 
variations from top to bottom. Further, we found that the term ‘retrofit’ itself is commonly used interchangeably 
with other activities, such as refurbishment or ‘repairs, maintenance and improvements (RMI) within the UK 
construction sector. The same word is used to describe programmes (of varying ambition) across domestic, 
commercial and public buildings. Nor is the term precise in scope, with the word retrofit covering anything from 
a some insulation, a building upgrade, refurbishment or repurposing, to a ‘deep retrofit’ involving full energy 
and building fabric measures. Some retrofit involves future proofing or resilience measures such as cooling, and 
in some contexts ‘retrofit’ is taken to refer to wider ecological systems such as water and waste. Retrofit might 
have a primary focus on preservation and conservation in heritage projects, or be conducted with a primary or 
secondary purpose of alleviating fuel poverty. In some countries, for example Japan, the term retrofit refers 
primarily to seismic measures, with energy efficiency measures being considered a secondary factor.  
Within the UK domestic market, we found this blurred terminology hid many assumptions and led to confusion 
when retrofit policy, funding, quality assurance and skills were discussed generically. The ‘retrofit’ term was 
used irrespective whether the context was large-scale social housing programmes, or a single home installing 
energy efficiency measures - despite programme design and project inception, funding, methodology, and even 
work force being wholly different within each scenario. This led us to look at how the domestic market 
segmented to try to identify the specific attributes and attitudes within core segments which broadly identify as:  
Local Authorities  Private Rented Sector (PRS) comprising 
- Large landlord organisations 
- Medium landlords  
- Single / small (aka accidental) landlords 
Social Housing  Owner Occupiers  
 
Segmentation - first mover theory  
Given the crossover and complexities between these segments, we found the most helpful and clear method of 
segmentation was to divide the domestic retrofit market based on who acts as the ‘first mover’.  
The term first-mover was initially used by Arup in a slightly different context, stating that the public sector 
needs to act as first-mover in promoting and implementing housing retrofit schemes (Jankel, 2013). Our first 
mover theory suggests the first mover is whoever takes responsibility for (and instigates) the retrofit process 
within that market segment.  
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This distinction is critical because where the first-mover is an organisation, such as social landlords or Local 
Authorities, there are clear pathways to programme design, stakeholder engagement and supporting policies and 
funding mechanism driving retrofit activities. Projects are typically larger schemes which are designed and 
project managed by building service professionals. Procured contractors carry out the work, either under contract 
to the first-mover or their partners. There is a higher likelihood of a longstanding funding scheme being available 
such as the Energy Company Obligation (ECO). There is often a route for the dissemination of new skills and 
practices through established channels such as CPD or degree apprenticeship programmes. Delivery models for 
community retrofit tend to be public-sector driven, either directly, or through arrangements with partners.  
The public sector tends to adopt the role of the first-mover, using established channels to create programme 
pathways, engage stakeholders, de-risk transactions and providing an evidence base for others to follow.  
Where the first-mover in the retrofit process is an individual, this is almost always the property owner, such as 
the owner-occupier or private landlord, and the pathways to impact are far less established, and in some cases 
non-existent. There are fewer funding schemes for support and accessing these schemes. such as the Green 
Homes Grant, when they do arrive is challenging for the reasons discussed above. While the Green Homes Grant 
also required TrustMark qualifications in contractors, uptake was low. Where no Government funding is 
involved, there is no legal requirement for the assessors or contractors to operate under PAS2035 or be 
Trustmark registered. Where there are regulatory drivers in place affecting individual first-movers such as the 
Private Rented Sector Minimum Energy Efficiency Standard for landlords, the thresholds are low, with policies 
under enforced and widely regarded as ineffective. 
When evaluating knowledge gaps and future training needs, there was further evidence of the divide between the 
approach of building services professionals within the more established supply chains who are trained and 
capable of designing and fitting large scale projects, versus the less formal unregulated workforce ‘operating in a 
low-skills equilibrium, whereby low quality assurance and significant design–performance gaps accompany low 
educational attainment and low wages’ as identified by Killip (2020). 
This divide was also evidenced by Interviewee responses about their views on PAS2035 - the new industry 
specification that lays out all retrofit energy efficient enhancements to the UK’s existing housing stock but in 
reality only affects the individual first-mover market of owner-occupiers or small landlords. 9 out of 10 
Interviewees had little or no knowledge of this standard. Only one – an industry senior with engagement at a 
strategic level within Construction Industry bodies - felt able to comment at all: “I think the whole approach 
from PAS2035 is refreshing, and it’s different, and it’s better. I’m not so sure the UK really gets it yet. In the big 
change, that’s got to happen.” (Interview Case #8) 
This first-mover difference is further evidenced by the disparities in the distribution of Energy Performance 
Certificates (EPCs) between owner-occupier, privately rented, and socially rented homes shown in Figure 1. 
Socially rented homes have a far higher proportion of their stock in the A-C EPC bands and nearly none in the 
F/G EPC bands. This is due to a combination of better policy design and implementation in the former tenure 
group. Viewing these projects through the lens of whether the first-mover in the retrofit process is an individual 
or an organisation allows insight into the barriers and drivers, and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the 
policies historically used to address those barriers. 
 
Figure 2: EPC Rating by 
Tenure, 2021, shows the 
disparity between EPCs 
for the social rented 
sector (where Local 
Authorities and Social 
Housing Landlords are 
first-mover, versus the 
owner occupier and 
private landlord sectors 
(where the individual is 
first mover). (House of 
Commons, Environmental 
Audit Committee, 2021) 
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Channel strategy versus financial self-interest  
The owner-occupier and private rental sector are the market segments that would most benefit from a redesigned 
customer journey around a cohesive channel strategy. In commerce, organisations invest in channel strategies to 
bring products and services to market out of self-interest. But no singular entity ‘owns’, organises or invests in 
domestic retrofit. The market has not self-organised and take up has been minimal. A framework for quality 
control exists within PAS2035, but there is little to drive individual first-movers to move or markets to catalyse. 
In a well-developed retrofit market, there would be potential for the contractor to prompt action, making 
suggestions about new energy efficiency retrofit options the way they would for a kitchen renovation or a 
replacement boiler. For now, there is nearly no evidence of this taking place.  
 
Distribution channels of this nature are complex behavioural systems in which people and companies interact to 
accomplish individual, company and channel goals  (Kotler et al, 2005). A more integrated customer journey 
based on service process design principles could galvanise consumer behaviour, ensure smarter interventions at 
more trigger points, and create a more balanced ‘supply-push and demand-pull’ system, based on proactive, 
integrated supply chains better skills, quality assurance and improved customer protection throughout.  
It is especially pertinent for LAs to take the lead and guide their residents to action on retrofit. Research shows 
despite a cultural shift, the growing public engagement in climate change has yet to translate to public 
understanding of specific issues, particularly with respect to creating a market demand for retrofit action. This 
lack of consumer motivation towards home retrofit should not come as a surprise. A poll showed regarding 
customer attitudes towards the decarbonisation of home heating found ‘natural gas’ is perceived to be lower-
carbon than grid electricity in the UK. Furthermore, in the same study around two-thirds of people admitted they 
‘have limited or no knowledge of the concept of Zero Carbon and also ‘a lack of awareness of the term ‘Net 
Zero’ (Hyde et al, 2020) 
When prompted, these consumers admitted they do not feel ultimately responsible for reaching net zero, 
although some recognise that they will need to play some part in doing so. Most default towards saying the 
government and energy companies have a much bigger role to play in making it happen—although they did not 
always trust that either would do so. Some feel like they are already doing their bit for the environment 
generally, through recycling or reducing plastic waste but when it comes to changing the way they use energy, 
they are unsure what steps they should take. (Hyde et al, 2020) 
The low priority of – and low motivation for – addressing energy issues in domestic consumer segments is not 
hidden. Nonetheless it is worth noting that policies have to date been designed with the belief that inertia in itself 
is not a barrier that needed to be addressed. UK policies such as the Green Deal were created with the belief that 
consumers would seek out retrofit out of financial self-interest. The low uptake of the Green Deal was due in no 
small part to a lack of interest among the able-to-pay market. Nearly a decade later, and following much wider 
public engagement on the issues of climate and energy, the UK Green Homes Grant programme was similarly 
structured around addressing the cost barrier and trusting the market would develop out of financial self-interest.  
At the time of writing the UK government has just ended the Green Homes Grant, nearly a year ahead of 
schedule and after only delivering measures to 10% of the promised number of homes. Demand for the Green 
Homes Grant varied significantly nationwide. In some regions, uptake was sufficiently high that there were not 
enough qualified installers to meet demand. However, there were also reports of installers being unable or 
unwilling to register for the scheme, due to high entry costs and administrative complexity. Even if this response 
did suggest that homeowners were very engaged in the market, there is no evidence that this engagement persists 
post-subsidy. Industry commentators are already citing the Green Homes Grant as yet another example of a 
boom-and-bust policy cycle that deters rather than encourages long term interest in a market for retrofit. 
From those interviewed for this work, even the more professional, established stakeholders, who generally serve 
the public sector-led and commercial retrofit market, confidence in retrofit as a near-future revenue stream 
varied. They broadly grouped into three categories which we termed: early adopters, followers, and pragmatists. 
The early adopters were actively discussing decarbonisation, passive design and finding low impact solutions 
with clients. Some have been studying it and championing it for years, and are now able to respond to market 
movements where they see growing demand: “What's interesting is we've internally we've been kind of playing 
with these topics for about four years, five years - since about 2016 - and it's only been the last two years that 
we've been able to kind of, you know, actually monetize, if you like.” (Interview Case #1) 
Follower organisations are seeing the change as it happens and will play catch-up, but are keen to engage with 
the market when they see a business case: “We’re quite good at adapting so we have the skill sets and we can 
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apply them. The last year has been a massive difference, and a big change in culture. Just over a year ago … we 
launched a big (net zero) strategy, it was just a massive culture change within the business.” (Interview Case #5) 
Pragmatists will likely need to be pulled by regulatory or market forces. They will engage but tended to be wary 
of green hype: “If I'm honest we're not doing a thing to specifically gear up for it (retrofit). Maybe that's naive, 
but … the marketplace determines it, and that in turn is usually led by regulations because that's what actually 
drives things in the real world, people becoming interested.” (Interview Case #3) 
The pragmatists (who made up 2 of the 10 interviewees) also showed a commoditised approach to the work, 
responding to the client’s price-driven brief, fitting the job to the price, rather than suggesting future-proof 
solutions: “The construction industry is very reluctant to change. It’s…driven by costs. Always has been, always 
will. (Interview Case #3); and “It’s not about sustainability. It’s not about passive design. At the end of the day 
it’s about profitabilities.” (Interview Case #10) 
Across both segments of the market - public sector and private - there is a longstanding barrier to retrofit 
described as ‘low priority of energy issues’ particularly compared to cost. This work suggests that while this is 
still very much the case for some, there are some organisations serving the public and commercial sector for 
whom energy and carbon are becoming a priority within their service offering. However, the barrier still exists 
that low-carbon retrofit has still not gained enough momentum to even be considered a market in its own right. 
As noted above, most Interviewees represented organisations that are starting to find emergent markets for those 
larger retrofit projects, but there is little evidence that this momentum will translate to individual householders or 
landlords in the able-to-pay market without significant intervention.  
Discussion 
The documentary analysis and Interview data enable answering of the research questions posed above. The 
research methods and findings were presented to staff from the participant case study council as stimulus, and 
their views are documented: 
1. What barriers exist in creating an enabling environment/policy roadmap to 2030?  
The first barrier identified is attitudinal - the low recognition of retrofit as a distinct market. The low priority of 
energy issues is a longstanding barrier but deserves renewed focus because increased public knowledge about 
climate change hasn’t translated to demand for building retrofit. The resulting gap is the correspondingly weak 
response to market-based policy signals or complex propositions such as the Green Homes Grant.  
The second barrier is the segmentation of the retrofit market based on whether the first-mover in the retrofit 
process is an organisation or an individual. The resulting gap is that the segments do not receive a sufficient 
distinction in the policies designed to target them.  
First-mover theory adds nuance to programme design and raises the question of what measures are needed to 
prompt uptake in the able-to-pay PRS and owner-occupier segments - and that these prompts are not limited to 
fiscal measures. A one-size fits all approach has largely assumed that financial self-interest will drive uptake, for 
example the lack of a clear route to market for PAS2035 outside of ECO.  Where the first-mover is an 
organisation there is a slow but visible pathway towards creating an enabling environment for 2030 but where 
the first-mover is an individual the path to creating an enabling environment for 2030 is far less clear. 
2. What are the respective roles of local and central government?  
According to the interviewed Local Government Staff Member: “Central Government should be avoiding short 
term programs with unrealistic delivery deadlines that deliver rushed, short term outcomes but may lead to 
unintended consequences and don’t help to solve the root causes of the system challenges.” 
Central Government has the clear challenge that large scale infrastructure decisions cannot be made in haste. 
Further, despite many calls for retrofit to be treated as a national infrastructure project, it is still does not fall 
under infrastructure, and policy approaches and fiscal support remains piecemeal. However, there is also a need 
for clarity as shown both in documentary evidence and the Interview Cases presented. Much of the industry will 
ramp up in response to clear long-term policy signals. Where Central Government seeks market-based 
mechanisms these mechanisms must better engage the markets they target. The details of these markets are often 
best understood by Local Governments themselves.  
For the segment where organisations are the first-movers in the retrofit market, the Local Government should 
seek to expand capacity for retrofit through existing skills dissemination routes and scale up markets. For the 
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segment of the market where the first-mover is an individual the council should seek to use their local networks 
to take on the role of ‘middle actor’ to galvanise services and prompt first-mover action. Local Authorities can 
then drive a cultural shift as trusted actors and leverage the national level drivers to create rapid change. 
“Local Governments are committed to serving their residents and improving their neighbourhoods, and therefore 
some measure of trustworthiness, holistic/long term decision-making, and a deep understanding of what works 
and doesn’t work locally. As a result, local government is well-placed to act in a co-ordination and enabling role 
for delivery – ideally working with private and third sector partners (including universities, citizens) who are 
more nimble and specialist and in the case of small and social enterprises have excellent local knowledge and 
networks. (e.g. the emergency food provision hubs and local testing centres run during the pandemic by local 
gov in partnership with local charities, NHS, etc.)” (Local Government Staff Member) 
This observation is validated by UKGBC research which suggests that local authorities are consistently more 
‘trusted’ than national government and other stakeholders. Because overcoming the barriers to home retrofit 
requires a holistic, city/local authority-wide strategy and the need for high levels of co-ordination across multiple 
actors, local/combined authority leadership will be essential to deliver action on home retrofit. (UKGBC, 2020) 
3. What is needed to align other stakeholders?  
The alignment of stakeholders again is best driven at the Local Government level. However, Councils are 
extremely resource constrained. There is great potential to use open collaboration to ease these constraints, 
however, even this collaboration requires an initial investment of time to build the needed links. 
 “Resources (financial and staff time) are extremely stretched and silo-ed, which makes collaboration/partnership 
building difficult to achieve – internally and externally. We need more open collaboration to provide access to 
research, resources, and networks to help deploy rapid change solutions. That is councils working with groups 
like universities and with each other.” (Local Government Staff Member) 
Conclusions 
The declaration of a Climate Emergency and the ambitious 2030 targets will require a step change in the way 
local authorities and councils work with partners and communities to tackle the impact of climate change within 
their local areas. Several barriers exist that will challenge Local Authorities in creating an enabling environment 
for these changes.   
Firstly there is scope for an assessment of whether the term ‘retrofit’ is apt for consumer facing market building 
or if there is a need for a new lexicon around decarbonisation, future-proofing and climate resilience. 
Secondly, there is a weakness in the market channel strategy. Where the ‘first-mover’ in the retrofit process is an 
organisation (e.g. social landlord), this work found that there are existing channels to drive retrofit action and 
upskilling. These channels should be strengthened and expanded. But where the first-mover is an individual (e.g. 
homeonwers and private landlords), channels are weak or non-existant.  This is a critical barrier, as policies 
insufficiently distinguish between the two groups, leading to a lack of drivers for individual first-movers. 
It is worth noting that decarbonising existing buildings poses a challenge worldwide. There are a range of 
successful examples such as regulatory efforts in Germany, effective ratepayer funded programs across the EU, 
and strong market driven policies in particular US states such as California and Oregon.  The UK can also point 
to its share of successful retrofit pilot projects. However none of these have delivered decarbonisation of the 
existing stock at the pace and scale demanded by the Climate Emergency. In short, no low carbon retrofit market 
can yet be considered mature in the way that we consider the market for amenity renovations. Yet while these 
problems are not unique to the UK, the UK does have several embedded features that will make these problems 
particularly challenging to solve.   
The UK’s adherence to the principle that retrofit markets will form simply out of financial self-interest in 
response to a price signal has been repeatedbly disproven in practice, but remains a tent-pole in retrofit policy 
making. Where they have attempted to create an enabling environment such as with PAS2035 and Trustmark, 
the routes to market for these measures are lacking. The first-mover framing described in this paper argues that 
the UK has much work to do in even establishing the channels through which such skills uptake and broader 
motivation for retrofit will reach individual first-movers such as private homeowners. 
National government should empower local government to explore retoftit solutions around first mover 
principles. Where resource constraints limit action, Local Authorities should seek open collaboration to expand 
knowledge exchange across these networks and develop novel localised approaches to retrofit processes.  
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For individual first-movers the local government should use their networks to serve as trusted middle-actors to 
drive the retrofit process. By reshaping the customer journey around a go-to-market channel strategy they could 
bring the stakeholders together around a quality assured, locally focused retrofit service. This could be rooted in 
a customer-centric channel strategy with a ‘service process design’ approach, using nudge theory and 
behavioural analysis, aligning all local stakeholders around an intuitive vertical channel that drives behaviour 
change and integrates services into a cohesive experience. This approach has been successful in other domains 
such as transportation, where London’s fragmented and siloed modes of travel have been brought together under 
one brand, with Transport for London (tfl) integrating a wide range of providers and data sources to gives a 
simple customer through-line for travel planning, journeys and billing across all modes of transport. 
A similar channel strategy model would build on the foundational work of the UKGBC’s Retrofit Playbook 
(UKGBC, 2020) with the overall goal of building a holistic retrofit offering around an integrated service design 
model, which would build community and neighbourhood action, engage retrofit providers, prompt large scale 
take-up and smooth the customer journey. As well as helping local councils deliver on their climate targets and 
steward their areas towards better environmental outcomes, this model would accelerate take up of retrofit in 
hard-to-reach segments, support local businesses, get young and disenfranchised residents into green jobs, 
alleviate fuel poverty and inadequate housing, and help consumers embrace more sustainable choices.  
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